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NOTES AND COMMENTS
AUTOMOBILES
NEGLIGENCE - RIGHTS OF INJURED PASSENGER - DOCTRINE
OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Plaintiff in an action to recover damages for personal injuries,
offers proof that he was a passenger in an automobile operated at mod-
erate speed over a considerably used road and was injured when the
automobile suddenly left the road and plunged over an embankment.
Held, the circumstances thereby established are sufficient to permit an
inference of negligence on the part of the operator, under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. Weller, Exrx. v. Worstall, 129 Ohio St. 596, 196
N.E. 637, 3 Ohio App. 12 (1935).
Briefly stated, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, is that where the
instrumentality or thing which caused the injury complained of is shown
to be under the management and control of a defendant, and the acci-
dent is such as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if
proper management and control is exercised, it affords reasonable evi-
dence, in the absence of explanation by such defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care, and permits the inference of negligence.
St. Marys Gas Co. v. Brodbeck, 114 Ohio St. 423, 151 N.E. 323
(1926); Hart v. Washington Park Club, 157 Il 9, 41 N.E. 620
(1895); 5 Wigmore Evidence (2nd ed. 1923).
The doctrine has undoubtedly been more frequently applied in cases
of public carriers of passengers than in any other class. Transportation
Co. v. Downer, ii Wall. 129, 20 U.S. 16o (1870). Ithas often been
applied in collision and derailment cases. Hooper v. Denver R.R. Co.
155 Fed. 273, 84 C.C.A. 21 (1907); Cincinnati St. R.R. v. Kelsey,
6 O.C.D. 209 (1895). But it has now been accepted that the doctrine
is not limited to railroads. Rose v. Stevens Co. ii Fed. Rep. 438
(1882); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Holzenkamp, 74 Ohio St. 379,
78 N.E. 529 (19o6).
In situations involving automobiles the doctrine has been applied in
the following cases. Zwick v. Zwick, 29 Ohio App. 522, 163 N.E. 917
(1928), where a driver permitted the steering wheel to escape his con-
trol, throwing the machine against poles and causing injury; Cleveland
Ice Cream Co. v. Call, 28 Ohio App. 521, 162 N.E. 812 (1928)
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where a person left his auto parked on the side of a hill and the car from
some unknown cause rolled down the hill and hit plaintiff; Scovannin v.
Toelke, II9 Ohio St. 256, 163 N.E. 495 (1928) where a truck
operated by the defendant ran off the highway and collided with and
damaged a building, and no other testimony was produced to prove
negligent operation of the truck; Trauerntan v. Oliver's .4dm'r. 125
Va. 458, 99 S.E. 647 (1919) where it was held that an auto driver
who collided with another person while the latter was standing upon the
sidewalk, must show that he did everything an ordinary reasonably
prudent person would have done to avoid injury. In one Ohio case,
however, no presumption or inference of negligence was held to arise.
Allen v. Learick, 43 Ohio App. IOO, 182 N.E. 139 (1932) where a
guest passenger was not permitted to recover under the res ipsa rule for
being thrown from the seat when the automobile bounced while crossing
an intersection.
In the principal case the instrumentality was under the control of
the defendant. Since an accident does not ordinarily happen by a car
leaving the road if reasonable care is used, the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to this situation seems justified.
JOSEPH STERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
POWER OF BOARD OF EDUCATION TO COMPEL SALUTE TO
FLAG - INVASION OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
Some time ago, the Board of Education of Greenfield, Ohio, estab-
lished the rule that "the Superintendent of Schools is directed to require
the flag salute and the pledge of allegiance from all pupils attending
the Greenfield Schools at such times and on such occasions as he may
direct." Ordinarily, the Superintendent required the salute and pledge
of allegiance only at assemblies of a patriotic nature, but teachers were
allowed to hold similar ceremonies as opening exercises. Though these
practices had been in effect over a period of time, no one, parents or
children, had objected until November, 1935. At that time, the par-
ents of four pupils, who were members of Jehovah's Witnesses, a re-
ligious sect, ordered their children not to salute the flag. The board
of education settled the problem by excluding these children from all
exercises at which a flag salute or pledge of allegiance was to be given.
The same problem has arisen in East Liverpool, but it has not been
solved so amicably. There, the board of education expelled those who
